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This paper aims to improve our understanding of how exploitative and explorative learning of 
firms is enhanced through their social capital. Both types of learning differ considerably from 
each other and we argue that the distinction between them may be an important contingency 
factor in explaining the value of direct, indirect and (non-)redundant technology-based 
alliances. In particular we argue that, since companies have to find a balance between 
explorative and exploitative learning (March, 1991), redundant and non-redundant links play 
a complementary role in inter-organizational learning processes: redundant information 
improves exploitative learning, non-redundant information enhances a firm’s explorative 
learning. The empirical results support the predictions about the contingency of the value of 
redundant information for both types of learning. Direct and indirect ties improve both types 
of learning but the impact on explorative learning is much larger. We find that direct ties have 
a moderating effect on indirect ties only in the case of exploitative learning. Firm size and 
technological distance between a firm’s partners also have a differential effect on exploitative 
and exploitative learning. 
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As competition becomes increasingly knowledge-based and companies get involved in 
accelerating technology races reducing time to market, they face considerable problems to 
develop the required knowledge and capabilities internally (Gomes-Casseres, 1996; Mowery, 
1988; Mytelka, 1991; Teece, 1992; Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002). Chesbrough (2003) 
coined the term “open innovation” to indicate that companies – even the largest and 
technologically leading ones – must complement their in-house R&D with external 
technologies on the one hand, and open up their own technological knowledge to outsiders on 
the other hand. In large companies, management is replacing the traditional inward focus of 
its technological competence building by a more outward-looking approach that draws 
heavily on technologies from networks of universities, startups, suppliers, and competitors. 
 
Technology based alliances between companies are one way to tap into these networks. 
During the last two decades technology based strategic alliances have started to play a major 
role as means of quasi-external knowledge acquisition modes (Hagedoorn, 1996; Hagedoorn 
and Duysters, 2002; Powell et al., 1996). A growing number of firms is realizing that 
alliances can be employed as effective learning mechanisms. Companies are increasingly 
pushed to enter ‘learning alliances’ through which they can speed up their capability 
development and reduce technological uncertainty by acquiring and exploiting knowledge 
that is developed by their alliance partners (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 1995). Hence, 
technological learning is increasingly based on a combination of internal and external 
learning: internal learning based on a firm’s own R&D efforts, external learning on the 
technology acquired from alliance partners. Both types of learning are complements 
reinforcing each other’s productivity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
  
However, considering inter-organizational networks of technology-based alliances as a set of 
‘learning alliances’ is clearly a simplification. In this study we focus on March’s (1991) 
distinction between exploitative and explorative learning: ‘exploitation’ is the refinement and 
extension of existing technologies, whereas ‘exploration’ is experimentation with new 
alternatives. March argues that each company needs to balance both types of learning to stay 
competitive in the short and the long run. There are considerable differences between both 
types of learning (March, 1991; Chesbrough, 2003), which, in turn, have important   2 
implications in the way a company can tap into the technological capabilities of its alliance 
partners. Although there are numerous studies that have investigated the relationship between 
a firm’s portfolio of technology alliances and its (technological) performance (Hagedoorn and 
Schakenraad, 1994; Shan et al., 1994; Powell et al., 1996; Mitchell and Singh 1996; Stuart, 
2000), only few of them pay particular attention to the exploitative or explorative nature of 
the inter-organizational learning in alliance networks (e.g. Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; 
Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002; Rowley et al., 2000)
1.   
 
The main aim of this paper is to improve our current understanding of how exploitative and 
explorative learning of firms is enhanced (or hampered) through technology-based alliances 
and the social structure of the alliance network. Ahuja (2000a) argues that three aspects of a 
firm’s alliance network structure have an impact on the technological performance of 
companies: “(1) the number of direct ties maintained by the firm, (2) the number of indirect 
ties maintained by the firm (the firm can reach in the network through its partners and their 
partners), and (3) the degree to which a firm’s partners are linked to each other (i.e., whether 
there are structural holes in the firm’s ego network)” (Ahuja, 2000a: p. 428). Similarly, we 
argue that these three aspects of a company’s network structure have an effect – albeit a 
different one – on its explorative and exploitative learning.  
 
We argue that the value of a firm’s alliance network is contingent on the type of learning
2. 
Since exploitative and explorative learning are quite different in nature, alliances (both direct 
and indirect ones) are expected to have a different impact on both types of learning. 
Explorative learning implies that the firm departs from its existing technology base and the 
knowledge involved is both tacit and novel to the firm (Levinthal and March, 1993; March, 
1991). In contrast, exploitative learning is likely not be tacit and entails less uncertainty 
because the company is experienced and has much of the required knowledge in-house 
(Hansen et al., 2001). We argue that this contingency allows us to detect significant 
differences in the value of direct and indirect ties. 
 
Moreover, we will also focus on the presence of redundant ties in the alliance networks. In the 
literature on social networks there are two opposing views on the benefits of redundant ties. 
                                                
1  Hansen et al. (2001) also enter this topic within the context of intra-organizational knowledge  
2  This approach is in line with recent studies that recognize that the value of social networks is contingent on 
particular circumstances (see Burt, 1997, 2000; Gabbay and Zuckerman, 1998; Hansen, 1999; Hansen et al. 
2001; Podolny and Baron, 1997; Uzzi, 1997; Walker et al., 1997)   3 
On the one hand, there is the structural hole theory of Burt (1992a) where firms can reap rents 
because of the absence of ties among its contacts. As a result, companies benefit from non-
redundant ties in their networks. This view is at odds with the social capital theory of 
Coleman (1988, 1990) where firms benefit from cohesive (redundant) ties with their alliance 
partners. However, a number of scholars (Ahuja 2000a; Burt 1998, 2000; Hansen et al., 2001) 
suggest that the two forms of social capital are not necessarily contradictory, but they rather 
play different roles in different settings or have different purposes. In other words, the value 
of redundant and non-redundant ties might be contingent on particular conditions. We argue 
that the distinction between explorative and exploitative learning may be an important 
contingency factor in explaining the value of (non-)redundant ties. In particular we argue that, 
since companies have to find a balance between explorative and exploitative learning, 
redundant and non-redundant contacts play a complementary role in inter-organizational 
learning processes. Companies have to make choices between bridging structural holes 
between the dense areas of an alliance network on the one hand and creating cohesive ties to 
benefit from its social capital in the network on the other hand. In other words, firms should 
make decisions about how and when to make use of redundant and non-redundant ties in their 
external acquisition of technology.  
 
In the next part, we will derive some basic hypotheses on the effect of firms’ alliance network 
structure on their innovative performance. In the empirical part of the study we will test these 
hypotheses using strategic technology alliance data and patent data of companies in three 
different industries over a time-span of 12 years.  
 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Balancing two different types of learning 
 
One of the major challenges in organizational learning is to find an appropriate balance 
between exploitative and explorative learning (March, 1991). Both types of learning serve 
different goals. Exploitative learning intends to refine and extend existing technologies or 
competencies. It is characterized as routinized learning, which adds to the existing knowledge 
and competencies of a firm without changing the nature of its activities (Hagedoorn and 
Duysters, 2002). Explorative learning involves searching and experimenting with new   4 
technologies or entrepreneurial opportunities. This non-routinized learning involves changes 
in company routines and experimentation with new alternatives (see, e.g. Dodgson, 1993; 
March, 1991), which, if successful, does change the nature of competencies of companies and 
it increases their innovative performance. Diversity and experimentation are central to 
successful entrepreneurial activity (Burgelman, 1983; Lant and Mezias, 1990; McGrath and 
MacMillan, 2000; Mezias and Glynn, 1993). Consequently, exploitative and explorative 
learning are very different from each other. In comparison with exploitation, exploration is 
more experimental in nature, long-term oriented, and highly uncertain. While exploitation can 
be planned and controlled, explorative learning can only be managed through an option 
generating strategy, characterized by goal autonomy and ambiguous structures (McGrath, 
2001). Because of the high level of uncertainty in explorative learning, planning is not an 
effective approach. Instead, companies should probe the future through a variety of low-cost 
probes and shape their next strategic moves accordingly (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998; Lynn 
et al. 1996). As a result, in many companies explorative learning is organized differently than 
exploitation which is much more related to the day-to-day activities (Vanhaverbeke et al., 
2003).    
 
As learning not only occurs within companies, but also between companies, one should take 
into account that exploitative as well as explorative learning take place in inter-organizational 
technology-based alliances (Rowley et al., 2000). Some alliances are established to deepen the 
existing technological capabilities of a company (i.e., exploitative learning), other alliances 
should make a firm familiar with novel or emerging technologies (i.e. explorative learning). 
In a dynamic environment, with changes in both industry players and dominant technologies, 
exploratory learning becomes increasingly important, not only in terms of the endogenous 
capabilities of companies, but also in terms of learning in a dynamic environment in which 
the relevance of the knowledge of partners is not clear in advance. Hence, dense patterns of 
interaction and ‘gregariousness’, with repeated contacts and continuous flows of information, 
have emerged (see Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002). These types of patterns are typical for 
exploratory networks. 
 
In this knowledge acquisition process the strategy for learning should however, not be either 
exploration or exploitation as a stand-alone strategy. As argued by March (1991), firms that 
engage exclusively in exploration often suffer from high experimentation costs, without 
exploiting its benefits. It leads to undeveloped ideas and competencies. Firms that engage   5 
exclusively in exploitation, however, often suffer from technological inertia. In other words, 
firms should maintain a balance between exploration and exploitation. Both types of learning 
compete for limited resources and there will always be a trade-off between investing in 
deepening and upgrading the existing technologies to safeguard profits today and exploring 
new technologies to secure future returns (Rowley et al., 2000; Levinthal and March, 1981). 
 
Strategic alliances and their role in exploitative and explorative learning  
 
As internal technology development is no longer sufficient to deal with the rapidly changing 
technological environment, a growing number of firms seems to recognize that external 
acquisition through alliances allows them to explore new and promising technological areas 
and enables them to strengthen or upgrade their existing technological capabilities at the same 
time (Duysters and de Man, 2003). Studies indicate that interfirm linkages indeed help firms 
to develop and absorb technology (Ahuja, 2000b; Harianto and Pennings, 1990; Powell et al., 
1996). The growing importance of external knowledge acquisition poses a number of 
important challenges to companies. One of the most prominent questions relates to the degree 
in which firms are able to absorb their newly acquired knowledge, i.e. the degree of their 
absorptive capacity
3. Lane and Lubatkin (1998) and Cockburn and Henderson (1998) argue 
that external networks enhance an organization’s absorptive capacity. In fact, experience in 
transferring knowledge through technology-based alliances might increase the absorptive 
capacity of the firms involved in two ways. First, by increasing the knowledge base 
communication between partners becomes easier. Second, experience with alliances results in 
the development of specific routines that support knowledge transfer (Simonin, 1999).  
 
In the case of exploitative learning, companies team up with partners to share R&D costs and 
risks, to obtain existing, complementary know-how avoiding in that way duplication of efforts 
(Teece, 1986), or to speed up the R&D-process in industries where time-to market is crucial. 
If a company establishes alliances with partners to strengthen its existing technology base (i.e. 
exploitative learning), it already owns much of the required expertise and know-how. The in-
house technological capabilities guarantee that the problem the alliance partners wish to focus 
on is clearly defined, possible solutions are known and that the partners have a fairly good 
understanding of the “causal mechanisms among the parameters involved in the task” 
                                                
3  Cohen and Levinthal (1990) define the absorptive capacity of a firm as its ability to value, assimilate and 
commercialize (or apply) new external knowledge.   6 
(Hansen et al., 2001, p. xxx). Acquaintance with the technology implies that the knowledge 
involved is to a large extent explicit and codified (Nonaka, 1994). The inter-organizational 
learning process can be planned and controlled to a large extent and targets can be set at the 
start. 
 
Explorative learning is different. This type of learning is not about improving the efficiency of 
the current businesses, but it is a search for new, technology based business opportunities. The 
lack of in-house knowledge on certain technological areas forces companies to team up with 
companies that are more knowledgeable on these technologies. Explorative learning creates 
diversity and variety, and as such opens options for entrepreneurial activities in established 
companies. Exploring new technology entails problems that are novel to the company and 
because of that knowledge is usually contested, tacit and hard to articulate. In explorative 
learning the outcome cannot be predicted at the start, but it is an entrepreneurial search 
process for business opportunities in technological areas that are relatively new to the 
company.  The inter-organizational learning process itself is hard to plan: because of its 
explorative nature the focal firm cannot predict how frequently it has to interact with its 
partners and about what issues. Besides, the tacit and contested knowledge involved in the 
process also implies that the contact between the partners will be iterative and informal 
(discussing ideas, exchanging views, reformulation of the strategy when unforeseen problems 
emerge, etc.).  
  
So far, we argued that an organization has to find a balance between explorative and 
exploitative learning, that these two learning types are different in nature, returns and 
organizational requirements, and that technology-based alliances are increasingly important to 
absorb external technological knowledge. Because there are marked differences between 
exploitative and explorative learning, we assume that the role of alliances and the structure of 
the alliance network is contingent on the type of learning. In line with Ahuja’s (2000a) study, 
we suggest that three aspects of a company’s technology-based alliance network should be 
analyzed in detail. We will argue that (1) the number of direct ties and (2) indirect ties 
maintained by the firm and (3) the degree of redundancy among the firm’s partners have a 
differential impact on explorative and exploitative learning. 
   7 
Direct ties 
By means of strategic technology alliances, firms are able to generate scale and scope 
advantages by internal development of core technologies, while increasing their strategic 
flexibility by means of learning through alliances. Strategic flexibility, in this case, refers to 
the ability of firms “to reposition themselves in a market, change their game plans, or 
dismantle their current strategies when the customer they serve are no longer as attractive as 
they once were” (Harrigan, 1985). 
 
Because risk associated with unfamiliar technologies is significantly higher than the risk 
associated with a company’s core technologies, firms increasingly use strategic technology 
alliances to learn from partners with a different technology base. Because of the low 
investments involved (compared to internal development) these alliances can be easily 
terminated when a certain technology turns out to be less interesting than expected. Therefore 
we expect that the number of direct ties is likely to be positively related to the innovative 
output of the firm, both the exploitation of its core technologies and the exploration of non-
core technologies.  
 
Next, external knowledge acquisition might be even more important in the case of developing 
technological capabilities that are new to the company – i.e. explorative learning. Different 
arguments point in that direction. First, organization theorists (Levinthal and March, 1993; 
Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) have argued that there is a positive feedback loop between 
experience and competence. Experience in a particular knowledge domain leads to increased 
absorptive capacity and enhanced competencies in this specific domain. A higher level of 
competence, in its turn, will lead to increased usage of the specific knowledge and therefore 
increases the level of experience. In spite of the positive effect of this cycle on the specific 
technological competences of companies, firms may fall into the so-called familiarity trap 
(Ahuja and Lampert, 2001): this cycle favors specialization and inhibits experimentation with 
unfamiliar technologies. Hence, strong technological capabilities tend to facilitate cognitive 
inertia, path dependency and low levels of experimentation (Stuart and Podolny, 1996). Firms 
with a relatively strong and successful technology base are often even more resistant to 
change than other firms. This so-called ‘success breeds failure syndrome’ (Starbuck et al., 
1978) is often observed in the case of established industry leaders. In this way, local search 
and organizational routines may eventually lead firms to miss out on new windows of 
opportunities related to experimenting with technologies beyond their core technologies.   8 
Teaming up with competent partners might then prove the only way to go beyond the current 
knowledge base. 
Second, exploitative knowledge creation can be based primarily on internal technology 
competencies. Companies involved in exploitative knowledge creation have much of the 
required knowledge in-house and teaming up with partners is only one (although maybe an 
important) of many alternative ways of strengthening their technological capabilities.  
 
Third, companies are often found to be very careful in sharing core technologies because of 
the dangers of partners ‘stealing’ the specific know-how in which a company has a 
competitive advantage. This problem is expected to be important in exploitative learning 
because in that case partners are likely to have similar technology profiles. This problem is 
furthermore aggravated because the cooperating companies are frequently (potential) 
competitors. Therefore, we expect that in teaming up with companies in non-core 
technologies sharing of technology will pose fewer problems than in the case of core 
technologies. Next, knowledge resulting from exploitative and explorative learning is 
different in nature. Exploring realms of knowledge that a company has not yet explored 
generates new, breakthrough innovations. These innovations generate valuable knowledge to 
patent compared to the incremental innovations resulting from exploitative learning. Finally, 
the nature of explorative learning implies that partnering companies usually get involved in a 
long-lasting and informal relationship. Exploration involves tacit knowledge, high 
uncertainty, and problems that are novel to the focal firm; this implies that successfully 
broadening the technology base of a company depends on the ‘quality’ of the relationship 
with its alliance partners (much more than in the case of exploitative learning). Over time and 
through prior experience with alliances firms develop capabilities or routines to manage 
alliances. As a result, companies that established many alliances in the past develop routines and 
alliance management skills which in turn lead to higher innovative output for the partnering 
company. We expect that these skills have a stronger impact on explorative learning because of 
its tacit and experimental nature. 
 
However, once firms are involved in an excessive number of technology alliances firms can 
start to suffer from information overload and diseconomies of scale. This occurs in particular 
when a firm tries to deal with too many unfamiliar streams of knowledge (Ahuja and 
Lampert, 2001). Management attention and integration costs also seem to grow exponentially 
once a certain optimal level of alliances has been established (Duysters and de Man, 2003).   9 
An alliance portfolio with too many alliances may lead to saturation and overembeddedness 
(Kogut et al., 1992; Uzzi, 1997). Therefore, at high levels of embeddedness marginal benefits 
of forming new linkages will be low and marginal costs of additional links will be relatively 
high (Ahuja, 2000a).  As a result, we expect an inverted-U shape relationship between the 
social capital of companies and their exploitative and explorative learning. 
Therefore we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: The past involvement of a firm in technology-based alliances (its social 
capital) has a stronger positive impact on the broadening of its knowledge 
base than on the strengthening of its core technologies. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: The past involvement of a firm in technology-based alliances (its social 
capital) is related in a curvilinear way (inverted-U shape) to both the 
strengthening of its core technologies and the broadening of its knowledge 
base. The effect on the latter is significantly stronger and overembeddedness 




Not only direct ties have an impact on the technological performance of partnering 
companies. Indirect ties also play a role because alliances can be a channel of communication 
between a focal firm and many indirect contacts, i.e. the partners of its partners, and so forth 
(Mizruchi 1989; Haunschild, 1993; Gulati, 1995a). The distinction between direct and indirect 
ties is important because two companies that have the same number of direct contact might 
still differ in the number of companies they can reach indirectly depending on the size and 
scope of their partners’ alliance networks (Gulati, 1999). A firm may have numerous alliances 
with partners that are not well connected to other companies. In contrast, a company may 
have a limited number of alliance partners, linking the focal company to a wide range a 
companies that have themselves alliances to other companies, and so forth. As a result, the 
social capital of a company is not only determined by its direct ties but also by the number of 
companies it can reach in the network through indirect ties.  
 
Indirect ties are important for both exploitative and explorative learning, but the impact on the 
latter is expected to be larger. First, if a company can reach many other companies through 
indirect ties it can often receive information about the findings of a broad set of research 
projects in the network (Ahuja, 2000a). Their indirect ties may also serve as a “radar” 
function for companies in the sense that relevant technological developments are brought to   10 
the attention of the focal firm. Next, the tacit and experimental nature of explorative learning 
implies that companies in search for opportunities beyond their existing technology base will 
have a difficult time recognizing and valuing the technology of potential partners as long as 
they are not connected through a common alliance partner. As a result, since indirect ties 
seem to play an essential role in the process of explorative learning, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The larger the number of indirect ties of a firm in the technology-based 
alliances network the greater the effect on both the strengthening and the 
broadening of its knowledge base. The impact of the number of indirect ties 
on the latter will be significantly larger.  
 
 
As argued by Ahuja (2000a), firms that are involved in many direct ties are likely to benefit 
less from their indirect ties than firms characterized by a more limited number of direct ties. 
His argumentation is twofold: First, firms that have many direct ties are likely to gain less 
new or additional information from their indirect ties. For firms establishing many direct ties, 
the information that can be obtained from indirect ties may be very similar to the knowledge 
already obtained by its direct contacts and is therefore more likely to be redundant. Second, 
firms with many direct ties may be more constrained in their ability to profit from new 
information through their indirect ties. When a company has many direct connections, the 
information that reaches the company through the network also reaches the partners of the 
focal firm’s allies, who may be potential competitors. 
 
We argue that the impact of direct ties on indirect ones is likely to depend on the context of 
exploitative or explorative learning. The contingency may result from the different mix of 
targets a company wants to reach through its alliance network. When a company intends to 
broaden its technology base, it is primarily interested in finding and getting access to new 
information and technologies. If a company explores new technologies through its alliance 
network, problems are novel to the firm and technological benefits might not be 
straightforward (Hansen et al., 2001). There is a high degree of exploration as the company 
departs from its existing knowledge base, and much of the knowledge involved in exploratory 
tasks is tacit, hard to articulate and can only be acquired through experience (Hansen, 1999; 
Hansen et al., 2001; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Von Hippel, 1994). A company will typically 
have many contacts with its alliance partners before an idea evolves into a valuable 
innovation. This, in turn, implies that having many direct contacts does not necessarily   11 
constrain the information stemming from indirect contacts. On the contrary, several direct ties 
provide different ways of exploring tacit and uncertain technological knowledge. Moreover, 
when a company explores new technological areas, it establishes in many cases alliances with 
companies that are not (potential) competitors: it is unlikely that potential competitors will 
capture the knowledge involved. Moreover, the sticky nature of the knowledge prevents an 
easy diffusion among partners. 
    
In contrast, when a company deepens its existing technology base much of the knowledge 
involved is likely not to be tacit, “…because the focal actor has much of the expertise required 
and hence is likely to understand the problem, possible solutions, and the causal mechanisms 
among the parameters involved in the task” (Hansen et al., 2001, p. xxx) . In this case, the 
information gained from many direct ties will substitute for information from indirect ties. 
Moreover, as the knowledge is explicit in nature it is also easily diffused among partners. 
Finally, the competitive threat is real since the focal company is partnering with companies 
that are likely to have a similar technology profile. This leads to Hypothesis 3: 
 
Hypothesis 3: The impact of the indirect ties of a firm in the technology-based alliance 
network is weakened by the number of direct ties. The effect of this 
moderating variable is more important for the strengthening of the firm’s 




Network structure of social capital  
There is an ongoing debate in the academic literature about the impact of redundant and non-
redundant network ties
4.  Burt (1992a,b, 2000) argues that a tie will provide access to new 
information and entrepreneurial opportunities to the extent that it offers non-redundant 
sources of information. In other words, Burt suggests that firms benefit from their alliances 
when they are connected to companies that are themselves not connected to the same network, 
i.e. that the alliance spans a structural hole. Structural holes guarantee that the partnering 
companies on both sides of the hole have access to different flows of information (Hargadon 
and Sutton, 1997). The information that comes from the mutually unconnected allies is non-
redundant. Burt (1992a) considers this type of network as efficient and information-rich 
                                                
4  The same debate is echoed in the discussion about the impact of strong and weak ties on firms’ 
performance (Granovetter, 1973; Powell, 1990; Rowley et al, 2000). Tie strength is generally defined as 
being based on a “combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual 
confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie” (Granovetter, 1973: p. 348).   12 
because the information a company gets from its alliance partners is non-redundant.  As a 
result, from the perspective of the structural hole theory ego-networks in which partners are 
not tied to each other are preferred to those where a company and its partners are members of 
a cohesive, clique like structure. On the contrary, Coleman (1988, 1990) and Bourdieu and 
Wacquant (1992) argue that companies can benefit from establishing alliances with 
companies that are densely tied to each other. The advantage related to this so-called network 
closure stems from the fact that these cohesive ties enable partnering firms to combine their 
skills, share their knowledge, and reap economies of scale in R&D. Moreover, cohesive ties 
are effective in sanctioning opportunistic behavior by one of the partners. Effective 
coordination in clique-like structures not only requires the reduction of opportunism but also 
demands trust and shared norms of behavior.       
 
The structural hole theory of Burt (1992a, 2000) where firms can reap ‘entrepreneurial’ rents 
because of the absence of ties among its contacts is apparently at odds with the network 
closure theory of Coleman (1988, 1990) where firms benefit from cohesive (redundant) ties 
with their partners. However, a number of scholars (Ahuja, 2000a; Burt 1998, 2000; Hansen, 
1999; Hansen et al., 2001) suggest that the two theories about the network structure of social 
capital are not necessarily contradictory, but they rather play different roles that may be 
valuable in different settings or for different purposes.   
 
In a similar vein, we argue that the distinction between explorative and exploitative learning 
may be one of these contingency factors determining the value of the network structure of a 
firm’s alliance portfolio. In particular we argue that the value of redundant and non-redundant 
ties is contingent on the type of inter-organizational learning in which the company is 
interested. In other words, firms should make decisions about how and when to make use of 
redundant and non-redundant ties in their external technology acquisition, depending on the 
type of learning. 
 
Non-redundant ties are expected to be powerful in technology networks because they can lead 
efficiently to novel information and technological innovations in emerging technological 
realms.  
 
In exploration, companies try to get a first, quick understanding on many different 
alternatives. “Information is relatively broad and general in nature, because the emphasis is on   13 
identifying alternatives rather than fully understanding how to develop any one innovation. … 
This task does not have a well-defined solution space so firms perform broad searches of their 
environments in order to identify a variety of future options.” (Rowley et al., 2000: pp. 373-
374). Since explorers want to cover a relatively broad range of technologies, it can be argued 
that non-redundant ties are advantageous in explorative learning. First, following the 
arguments advanced by Granovetter (1973) and Burt (1992a, 2000), companies in search for 
new knowledge - explorative learning - will benefit more from non-redundant ties spanning 
structural holes than from dense network ties because the latter are less likely to provide new, 
non-redundant information or knowledge. Second, when firms are only exploring 
technological realms and do not need a full understanding of the technology, they may 
tolerate some information noise and do not need redundant sources of information to evaluate 
the information (Rowley et al., 2000). Network inertia is a third reason why ties bridging 
structural holes may be advantageous in explorative learning: benefits of explorative learning 
will be larger the more the focal learning firm can search for knowledge outside its existing 
network relations
5. Risk hedging might be considered a last reason why firms engage in non-
redundant relationships: by employing several technology alliances at the same time firms 
hedge the risks associated with missing out on important new technological developments 
(Nicholls-Nixon and Woo, 2003). 
 
In contrast, we argue that redundant ties offer considerable advantages when a company is 
primarily interested in the refinement and the extension of its existing technologies and 
competencies. Exploitative learning implies that companies refine and strengthen their 
existing technology base and for that purpose they need specific and fine-grained information 
that will provide a deeper knowledge of this particular technology. In contrast with 
explorative learning, exploitative learning “…requires a deeper understanding of specific 
information rather than a wider grasp of general information” (Rowley et al., 2000, p. 374). 
Dense, clique-like structures of the ego-network provide the best network structure to meet 
the information requirements for exploitative learning. Exploitative learning is about 
strengthening and refining the firm’s core technology; this implies both high-quality, fine-
grained information and trust-based governance (Uzzi, 1997; Larson, 1992). Information 
theorists argue that information noise is reduced and high-quality information is obtained 
when firms have access to multiple and redundant information sources (Shannon, 1957). 
                                                
5  Both arguments have also been developed by Hansen (1999) within the context of inter-unit knowledge 
sharing.   14 
When a firm’s partners are mutually connected to each other, they provide redundant 
information. Thus, dense ego-networks help a company to evaluate the obtained information 
and to get a deep understanding of a specific technology. Moreover, these dense networks 
serve as an alternative social control mechanism alleviating the risks associated with 
opportunistic behavior (Williamson, 1985); trust is crucial in exploitative learning because a 
firm’s core technologies are one of the major sources of its current competitiveness and 
profits. Partners have to be trusted before they can touch the ‘heart’ of the company. 
 
March (1991) argues there should be balance between exploitative and explorative learning in 
order to stay competitive both in the short and the long term. Therefore, both types of learning 
are required simultaneously but for different purposes. Since we expect that non-redundant 
ties are valuable in explorative learning and redundant ties in exploitative learning, we would, 
therefore, argue that firms should develop a well-balanced portfolio of both types of ties with 
their alliance partners. Rowley et al. (2000) have argued that the proportion of resources 
allocated to exploitation and exploration differs across environments and is determined by 
environmental conditions: the larger the environmental uncertainty and instability the more a 
company will invest in explorative learning. However, different companies facing the same 
changes in their environment seem to choose for different portfolios of non-redundant and 
redundant ties depending on their overall corporate strategy; the choice for redundant or non-
redundant ties is in our view not determined by the industry setting but rather by corporate 
actions to build and maintain competitive advantage. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 4: If a company intends to strengthen its existing technology base (core 
technologies) the replication of existing ties (creating redundancy) is most 
effective as put forward by the network closure theory of social capital.  
 
Hypothesis 5: If a company intends to broaden its technology base the use of non-
redundant ties will be more effective as put forward by the structural hole 
theory of social capital.  
 
 
DATA, VARIABLES AND METHODS 
 
Data 
The hypotheses were tested on a longitudinal dataset consisting of the alliance and patenting 
activities of 116 companies in the chemicals, automotive and pharmaceutical industries. These   15 
focal firms were observed over a 12-year period, from 1986 until 1997. The panel is, 
however, unbalanced, because of new start-ups and mergers and acquisitions. This sample 
was selected to include the largest companies in these three industries that were also 
establishing technology based strategic alliances (alliance data were retrieved from the 
MERIT-CATI database
6). Information on the establishment of alliances is hard to obtain for 
small or privately owned companies. Previous studies on inter-firm alliances also focused on 
leading companies in an industry (Ahuja, 2000a; Gulati, 1995b; Gulati and Garguilo, 1999). 
 
All social capital measures were calculated based on the alliance matrices that were 
constructed from the MERIT-CATI database. For each of the three sectors an alliance matrix 
was constructed for each year, containing the technology-based alliances that were established 
by the focal firms prior to a given year. In constructing measures of social capital based on past 
alliances, a number of choices have been made. First, we do not consider different types of 
alliances separately. Second, we did not weigh each type of SA according to the ‘strength’ of 
their relationship as some authors did (see Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Gulati 1995b; Nohria 
and Garcia-Pont, 1991). The third choice relates to the length of the period during which the 
existing alliance portfolio is likely to have an influence on the current technological performance 
of a company. We chose for a moving window approach, in which alliances were aggregated 
over the five years prior to a given year, unless the alliance database indicated another life-
span (Gulati, 1995b). The lifespan of alliances is assumed to be usually no more than five years 
(Kogut 1988, 1989).   
 
All patenting data were retrieved from the US Patent Office Database for all the companies in 
the sample, also those based outside the US. Working with U.S. patents – the largest patent 
market - is preferable to the use of several national patent systems “…to maintain consistency, 
reliability and comparability, as patenting systems across nations differ in the application of 
standards, system of granting patents, and value of protection granted” (Ahuja, 2000a; p. 
434)
7. Especially in industries where companies operate on an international or global scale 
U.S. patents may be a good proxy for companies’ worldwide innovative performance. 
 
                                                
6  The MERIT-CATI database contains information on nearly 15 thousands cooperative technology 
agreements and their ‘parent’ companies, covering the period 1970-1996. The alliances in the database are 
primarily related to technology cooperation. See Hagedoorn and Duysters (2002) for a further description. 
7  See also Basberg (1987) and Griliches (1990).   16 
For companies in the three sectors the financial data came from Worldscope, COMPUSTAT 





The different hypotheses test in one way or another the effect that direct ties, indirect ties and 
the network structure have on the deepening and broadening of the technology base of 
different companies in the chemical, automotive and pharmaceutical industry. Yearly patent 
counts were used to derive the two dependent variables. Technological profiles of all focal 
companies were computed to find out whether a patent in a particular year has to be 
categorized as ‘exploitative’ or ‘explorative’. These technological profiles were created by 
adding up the patents that a firm received in each patent class during the five years prior to a 
given year
8. A moving window of 5 years is the appropriate time frame for assessing the 
technological impact (Podolny and Stuart, 1995; Stuart and Podolny, 1996; Henderson and 
Cockburn, 1996; Ahuja, 2000a). Studies about R&D depreciation (Griliches, 1979, 1984) 
suggest that knowledge capital depreciates sharply, losing most of its economic value within 5 
years. As a result, a 5-year period is appropriate to assess the technological profile of a 
company. The classes were determined at two-digit level, which resulted in approximately 
400 classes. 
 
These technology profiles allow us to make a distinction between exploitative and explorative 
technology classes. Classes in which a company had not received a patent in the previous five 
years and did receive a patent in the year of observation were considered ‘explorative’ patent 
classes. We chose the year when the company filed for the patent rather than the year when it 
was granted, because the innovation in the company has been realized when the company files 
for a patent rather than when it is granted. Explorative patents kept this ‘status’ for 3 
consecutive years
9. All the classes in which a company had successfully applied for a patent 
the previous five years and successfully applied for a patent in the year of observation were 
considered ‘exploitative’ patent classes.  
                                                
8   Calculating technology profiles for larger companies poses its own problems especially when a ‘mother’-
company has several ‘daughters’. Therefore, the focal firms were first aggregated to the mother level and the 
list of these firms was used to derive the technological profiles. 
9  This is similar to the ‘novel technologies’-concept developed by Ahuja and Morris Lampert (2001). We also 
calculated explorative learning for a period of 5 instead of 3 years.   17 
 
The dependent variable ‘broadening of technology base’ was then made up by adding up all 
the patents applied for in the year of observation in the explorative patent classes. The same 
was done for the dependent variable ‘deepening of technology base’, adding up the patents in 




The impact of social capital on innovative output of companies has been explored among 
others by Ahuja (2000a) and Ahuja and Lampert (2001). In this paper, innovative output of a 
company is split up into the deepening or strengthening of the existing technology base and 
the exploration of new technological fields. We have argued that the former should benefit 
from a dense ego-network, while the latter is will be spurred by the presence of the structural 
holes. For an accurate understanding of the impact of redundant and structural hole spanning 
alliances on both dimensions of innovative firm behavior, the firm’s ego network should be 
decomposed into distinct and separate elements. Following Ahuja, (2000a) we make a 





The first dimension of social capital is ‘direct ties’. Direct ties can be measured by the degree 
centrality (number of alliances between the focal firm and its allies) in the alliance network or 
by the number of allies that the focal firm is directly connected to (i.e., the size of the ego-
network). Since the valued data in the adjacency matrices of the alliance networks are based 
on the number of alliances between firm i and j, we prefer to use the number of allies that the 
focal firm is directly connected to as a measure for direct ties.  We also introduce the squared 
term of this variable since hypothesis 1b suggests an inverted U-shaped relationship between 




A second dimension of the social capital of a company consists of firms it can reach indirectly 
in the alliance network through its alliance partners and their partners. Two companies whose 
ego-networks have the same size might still differ in the number of companies they can reach   18 
indirectly depending on the size and scope of their partners’ alliance networks (Gulati, 1999). 
A firm may have numerous alliances with partners that are not well connected to other 
companies. In contrast, a company may have a limited number of alliance partners, who again 
link the focal company to a wide range of firms that have themselves alliances to other 
companies, and so forth. As a result, the social capital of a company is not only determined by 
its direct ties but also by the number of companies it can reach in the network through indirect 
ties. 
 
There are different possibilities to operationalize the breadth of coverage of indirect ties. 
Closeness centrality, betweenness centrality, Bonacich centrality and reach centrality are 
various actor centrality measures that are good proxies for this variable. However, these 
centrality measures do “…not account for the weakening or decay in tie strength between 
firms that are connected by increasingly large path distances. Yet …it is probable that as the 
shortest paths connecting two firms grow longer, the likelihood of information transmission 
between them decreases.” (Ahuja, 2000a: p. 438). Therefore, we introduce a variable that 
measures the impact of indirect ties while taking into account the decline in tie strength across 
more distant ties
10. The measure, which we call “distance weighted centrality”, is provided by 
Burt (1991). The variable “… attaches weights of the form 1  – (fi/(N+1)) to each tie, where fi 
is the total number of nodes that can be reached up to and including the path distance i, and N 
is the total number of firms that can be reached by the focal firm in any number of steps” 
(Ahuja 2000a: p. 438). The result is that alliance partners receive smaller weights the longer 
the path distance to the focal firm. The “distance weighted centrality” can be calculated 
adding up all alliances at several distances weighted by their path distances (Ahuja, 2000a).  
 
Social capital: network closure versus structural holes  
 
The literature offers several possibilities to operationalize the (non-)redundancy of alliances. 
We expect that non-redundant ties may be beneficial for explorative learning and that 
redundant ties may be helpful in exploitative learning. For that purpose, we constructed some 
(non)-redundancy variables. Most – if not all – researchers that have been involved in 
empirical studies on inter-organizational networking and social capital have chosen for a 
                                                
10  We report only the findings for the distance-weighted centrality (see tables 3a and 3b). We tested the 
robustness of the findings with the before mentioned centrality measures and obtained similar results. 
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single measure of social capital (Burt, 1992a; McEvily and Zaheer, 1999; Gulati, 1999; 
Ahuja, 2000a; Baum et al., 2000). In this paper, we develop different measures to formalize 
the notion of social capital. We refer to Borgatti et al. (1998) for an extensive analysis of 
network measures that can be used to formalize the notion of social capital.  
 
Burt (1992a,b) argues that the two empirical conditions that indicate a structural hole (or non-
redundancy) are cohesion and structural equivalence. Both conditions reveal that there are 
structural holes by indicating where they are absent. The cohesion criterion indicates that two 
partners of the focal firm “…are redun dant to the extent that they are connected [to each 
other] by a strong relationship. A strong relationship indicates the absence of a structural 
hole.” (Burt, 1992b: p. 66). Structurally equivalent partners of the focal firm have the same 
alliance connections to every other company in the network. Therefore, they have the same 
sources of information and provide redundant information to the focal firm. Cohesion focuses 
on the direct ties between a focal firm’s partners, structural equivalence concerns the indirect 
ties of a focal firm’s partners with more distant companies in the alliance network. 
 
The first one, proportion density (Burt, 1983; Hansen, 1999), captures redundancy by 
cohesion indicating the presence of alliances between a focal firm’s allies. Alliance partners 
are redundant to the focal firm when alliances have been established between them. 
Proportion density is calculated as the number of ties (not counting ties involving the focal 
company) divided by the number of pairs where ‘pairs’ are potential ties
11. The values for this 
variable range from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates that all allies are directly linked to each other
12.    
 
Another variable to measure social capital in terms of structural holes is the “effective size” of 
a firm’s network (Burt, 1992a: chap. 2). This variable measures the number of non-redundant 
ties in a firm’s ego-network
13. More specifically, it is the number of partners the focal firm is 
                                                
11 Pairs and ties are calculated with the ego-networks procedure in UCINET VI (Borgatti et al., 2002). The 
inclusion of the proportion density variable reduces the degrees of freedom because it is undefined for 
pairwise isolates.  
12  McEvily and Zaheer (1999) introduced the concept of ‘bridging ties’. Bridging ties link a focal firm to 
other companies that are not otherwise accessible to this firm (they connect a focal firm to sources of 
information and opportunities that are not available from other network contacts). Bridging ties measure 
the proportion of non-redundant ties and are in this way measuring the same as ‘proportion density’ but in 
an opposite way. For ‘bridging ties’ low (high) values indicate low (high) non-redundancy – exactly the 
opposite of ‘proportion density’. Hence, the significance of the coefficient for the ‘proportion density’ in  
tables 3a and 3b is the same for the ‘bridging ties’-variable but the sign should be reversed.    
13  Burt’s (1992a, chapter 2) measure for “effective size” is:    20 
connected to, minus the redundancy in the network, i.e. it reduces to the non-redundant ties of 
the network. When “effective size” is divided by the number of partners in the firm’s ego -
network it measures the “network efficiency” of that network. This efficiency ratio ranges 
“…from a maximum of one, indicating that every contact in the networ k is non-redundant, 
down to a minimum approaching zero, indicating high contact redundancy and therefore low 
efficiency” (Burt, 1992a: p. 53). We assumed in hypothesis 5 that structural holes in the 
alliance networks will enhance the broadening of the technology base of innovating 
companies. As a result we expect a positive relationship between explorative learning and 
network efficiency. The coefficient is expected to change sign when focusing on its effect on 
the deepening of the existing technology base of a company. 
 
“Clique overlap centrality” is a variable that measures the information available to firms 
from their position in the network (Everett and Borgatti, 1998; Gulati, 1999). It measures the 
extent to which the actor is a member of overlapping cliques in the network. The idea is that a 
firm that belongs to many cliques is one that is located in the midst of dense clusters of firms 
that have ties with each other. Thus, clique overlap centrality indicates embeddedness in 
dense regions of a network. In this sense “clique centrality overlap” measures redundancy  – 
network closure argument). Hence, firms with a high value for clique centrality overlap have 
access to redundant information and, therefore, we a expect positive (negative) relationship 





Apart from redundancy based on cohesion, redundancy can also be based on structural 
equivalence as argued by Burt (1992a,b). Two firms are structurally equivalent to the extent 
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 Where j indexes all of the partners that the focal firm i has contact with, and q is every third partner other 
than i or j.  
The quantity (piqmjq) is the level of redundancy between the focal firm and a particular alliance partner, j.  
14  “Clique overlap centrality” is calculated using UCINET VI identifying the Luce and Pe rry (1949) cliques. 
Those cliques identify groups of firms that are linked to each other by alliances. The minimum clique size 
we specified was three. The scores for the clique centrality of each firm were expressed as a ratio to the 
score of the most central firm in the network.  
15  Clique overlap centrality resembles other centrality measures that we introduced earlier, but there are 
significant differences: “In networks where there is just one region (as in a core/periphery structure), 
clique overlap centrality correlates highly with other centrality measures (as they do with each other). But 
when the network consists of multiple clumps separated by structural holes, clique overlap centrality can 
be quite different from the other measures” (Everett and Borgatti, 1998: p. 59).   21 
that they have alliances with the same other firms in the network. Even in absence of an 
alliance between these two firms they will provide similar information to the focal firm 
because they are linked (directly and indirectly) to the same other companies in the overall 
alliance network. In this way, they are redundant contacts to the focal company; they are 
redundant by structural equivalence. We provide two redundancy measures based on 
structural equivalence.   
 
The first variable that captures redundancy by structural equivalence is provided by Hansen 
(1999). Applied to an inter-organizational setting, we can calculate the Euclidian distance for 
all firms in the alliance network. Thereby we exclude the alliances between the focal firm and 
its partners because we intend to measure the extent to which the alliance partners of the focal 
firm are connected to other firms in the overall network. Therefore, the calculation was 
performed on matrices excluding the row and column for the focal firm (Hansen, 1999). The 
Euclidean distance between two alliance partners of the focal firm, i and j, is given by 
Wasserman and Faust (1994: p. 367)
16.  This measure will equal zero when two partners of 
the focal firm are structurally equivalent. Euclidean distances can be converted into a 
redundancy measure by taking the average of the Euclidean distances between pairs of direct 
partners (allies) of the focal company. High values for this variable indicate that the focal firm 
has alliances with partners that are not structurally equivalent and will give the firm non-
redundant information. Thus we expect a positive sign when a company explores new 
technological fields and a negative sign when it depends on its existing technological 
capabilities.  
 
Structural equivalence can also be calculated based on the correlation coefficient of every pair 
of profiles. Redundancy is calculated in the same way as before but with correlation instead of 
Euclidian distance. The advantage of using correlation to measure structural equivalence 
among a company’s partners is that the values are independent of the overall network size. 
The values for this variable range from +1 (high redundancy) to –1 (non-redundancy). 
Consequently, opposite signs should be expected when the redundancy measure  is based on 
correlations instead of Euclidean distances.  
 
                                                
16  Hansen (1999, p. 96) and Wasserman and Faust (1994, p. 367): 
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Walker et al. (1997) have developed a variable that also measures social capital based on 
structural equivalence albeit in a complete different way. Their structural equivalence 
measure refers to the pattern of partner sharing: structural equivalent firms have relationships 
with the same other firms in the network. “Therefore, measuring structural equivalence in 
practice almost always depends on the assessment of relative partner overlap” (Walker et al., 
1997: p. 115). To measure in how far firms in a group share partners requires one can 
examine the dispersion of inter-group densities (Gi) around the network average. An equation 
that calculates density dispersion is: 
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j
ij j i i d d m n G
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“In this equation, Gi is the measure of the dispersion of intergroup densities for the ith group 
in the network, ni is the number of firms in the ith group, mj is the number of partners in the 
jth partner group , dij is the density of the intersection of the ith and the jth groups, and d* is 
the overall density of the network” (Walker et al., 1997: p. 115).  Summing Gi over all groups 
produces a measure of network structure: 
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Dividing equation (1) by equation (2) produces a measure of each group’s percentage 
contribution to network structure. This variable varies between 0 and 1, and represents the 
dispersion of group densities normalized by the way in which a network is structured in a 
particular industry and year (Walker et al., 1997: p.116). 
 
For our purpose, this variable represents the dispersion of alliances across different 
structurally equivalent (SE) groups of partners. All else equal, the more the SE group of the 
focal firm has alliances to all different SE groups of partners, the lower the value for this 
variable. High densities that are concentrated into one or a few partner groups (i.e., high 
values for this variable) mean that the focal firm (and its structurally equivalent group of 
partners) has established many alliances with selected structurally equivalent groups of 
partners.  
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We have to be cautious with this variable however, for several reasons. First, it does not 
measure social capital of an individual (focal) firm but it indicates how the relations of the SE 
group to which it belongs are distributed among partner groups. Second, this variable 
“…penalizes small groups of firms with small partner groups” (Walker  et al., 1997: p. 115). 
This variable tends to zero for SE groups that only establish alliances among themselves 
because we excluded diagonal values in the density matrix. The value for this variable 
increases (to a maximum of one) the larger the size of the focal group of SE and the more it 
has dense ties with a single but large group of SE firms.  
 
We expect that there will be a positive relation between both exploitative and explorative 
learning and ‘pattern of partner sharing’. SE firms are expected to be similar to each other 
because they have the same relations to the other firms in the network. A large group of SE 
firms that has dense ties with another single, large set of SE partners (and not with other SE 
partner groups), represents a kind of ‘learning highway’ between two groups of firms with 
different technological capabilities. Moreover, since the firms of both ends of the ‘highway’ 
are SE, they can easily learn from each other through spillover effects. These spillover effects 
are small or even non-existent when a company belongs to a small SE group or when an SE 
group has dense ties with too many other SE partner groups (i.e., when learning is not 
focused). In this way, we expect a positive coefficient for ‘the pattern of partner sharing’ 
variable for both types of learning. However, the impact on explorative learning might be 
significantly larger than for exploitative learning because of the high uncertainty involved and 
the fact that it is unclear which technologies are worthwhile to explore. In this situation it 
might be comfortable for explorers to get feedback from other companies in their SE group 




While the primary focus of this study is to analyze the effect of social capital and its network 
structure on exploitative and explorative learning, there may also be other factors that could 
affect these two types of learning. We included three types of dummy variables. A first dummy  
variable indicates in which economic block the company is headquartered. Following the Triad-
concept of the world economy, a company can be headquartered in North America, Asia or 
Europe - the default is Asia. Firms from a different economic block may differ in their propensity 
to patent. Annual dummy variables were included to capture changes over time in the propensity   24 
of companies to patent their innovations.  Finally, we included a dummy variable to indicate 
whether a company is a car manufacturer or chemical firm (default is the pharmaceutical 
industry).  
 
Furthermore, we included two organizational variables. First, the natural logarithm of ‘corporate 
sales’- a proxy for firm size - was included as a control variable. Firm size is expected to 
enhance exploitative learning (Acs and Audretsch, 1991). Large firms have the financial 
means and vast technological and other resources to invest heavily in R&D. However, they 
usually experience problems in diversifying into new technological areas inhibiting 
experimentation and favoring specialization along existing technological trajectories 
(Levinthal and March, 1993; March, 1991; Ahuja and Morris Lampert, 2001). As a result we 
expect that large firms have an advantage over small ones in exploiting technological 
dynamics with a cumulative nature, but they may be at a disadvantage with respect to 
experimenting and exploring new technological fields. 
 
The other organizational variable is the natural logarithm of R&D expenditures. We expect a 
positive and significant coefficient in both regressions. Assuming that there exists a positive 
correlation between technological input and output (Pakes and Griliches, 1984) we expect that 
firms that invest heavily in R&D will have a higher rate of innovation. Also R&D investments 
play a role in the ability of companies to recognize, value and assimilate external knowledge. 
This absorptive capacity of companies is crucial to acquire and integrate external knowledge, 
especially when the knowledge is tacit. Firms conduct R&D to be more able to use the 
technology of other companies (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Kim, 1998; Mowery and Oxley, 
1995).  This absorptive capacity argument is particularly relevant in the case of explorative 
learning because the knowledge to transfer is tacit and the focal firm has not yet built any 
capabilities in these technological areas.    
 
Technological diversity between the firm’s partners in the alliance network has to be 
introduced as another control variable according to Ahuja (2000a). His argument is twofold. 
First, if a firm’s allies are active in widely different technological fields, they may remain 
unconnected, generating structural holes in a focal firm’s alliance network. Next, if partners 
are highly heterogeneous in their technology base, collaboration is unlikely because they do 
not have the required absorptive capacity to learn from each other (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1989; Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Stuart, 1998). As a result, structural hole measures might   25 
reflect the negative impact of technological distance between its allies rather than social 
structural effects as postulated in hypotheses 4 and 5.   
 
Yao (2003) provides an interesting way to calculate the technological distance between a 
focal firm’s partners. “The knowledge distance among a firm’s direct alliances (excluding the 
firm itself) is the average distance among those firms. We take the sum of each dyadic 
distance between a firm’s direct contacts and divide the value by the total number of direct 
alliances of the firm. Since each pair of firms is counted twice, we also divide the value by 2 
to get the final technology distance among a firm’s alliance” (Yao, 2003: p. 12). The 
technological distance between companies can be calculated as follows: 
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Where j and k represent the jth and kth partner (j g k) of the focal firm i. Pit is the number of 
partners the focal firm year t. Ct is number of patent classes issued to the set of all sample 
firms in year t. Njct and Nkct represent the number of patents in the cth patent class filed for 




The two dependent variables are count variables and take only nonnegative integer values - 
i.e. the number of patents a firm filed for in a particular year in patent classes in which it has 
issued patents during the past 5 years (exploitative learning) and the other ones (explorative 
learning). A Poisson regression approach provides a natural baseline model for such data 
(Hausman et al., 1984; Henderson and Cockburn, 1996). Since we use pooled cross-section 
data with several observations on the same firms at different points in time, we modeled the 
data using a random effects Poisson estimator with a robust variance estimator.   26 
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whe re the par ameter ë it represents the mean and the variance of the event count and yit the 
observed count variable. It is furthermore assumed that: 
 
ë it =  â’xit         (2) 
 
with xit being a vector of independent variables. 
 
The above specification assumes that the mean and variance of the event count are equal. 
However, for pooled cross-section count data the variance often exceeds the mean. This 
overdispersion is particularly relevant in the case of unobserved heterogeneity
17.  Therefore, a 
random effects Poisson estimator with robust variance estimator is used: it does not assume 
within-firm observational independence for the purpose of computing standard errors.  For the 
random effects Poisson estimator equation (2) is changed into: 
 
ë it =  â’xit + ui        (3) 
 
where ui is a random effect for the i
th firm and reflects the firm-specific heterogeneity. 
 
Unobserved heterogeneity may be the result of differences between companies in their 
innovation generating capabilities, and as a consequence, also in their propensity or ability to 
patent. Such unobserved heterogeneity, if present and not controlled for, can lead to 
overdispersion in the data or serial correlation. Including the sum of alliances that a firm 
entered in the last four years (moving window approach) as an additional variable is a 
common method of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity (Heckman and Borjas, 1980).  
 
Differences in patenting behavior between companies or between different years are captured 
by including dummy variables in the model. First, the propensity to patent may be partly 
                                                
17  The presence of overdispersion does not bias the regression coefficients. Rather the computed standard 
errors in the Poisson regression are understated, so that the statistical significance is overestimated.   27 
determined by the nationality of the companies or the industry to which they belong. 
Similarly, we introduced annual dummy variables to account for changes over time: they may 






Table 1 represents the description of the different variables. Table 2 provides the descriptive 
statistics and the correlations between all the variables for the 662 observations in the sample. 
Although the sample represents the prominent firms in the three sectors, there is quite some 
variance on most of the key variables. The ‘distance weighted indirect ties’ are not highly 
correlated with the number of direct ties but, among the structural hole variables, clique 
overlap centrality correlates strongly with the number of direct ties. 
 
Table 3a en 3b represent the results of the regression analysis using random-effects Poisson 
estimations respectively for the deepening of the technology base and the broadening of it. 
The basic model is presented in model 1. It is worthwhile mentioning some differences 
between the basic models in the two tables. First, there are no statistically significant 
differences between the three industries (chemical industry, car manufacturing and 
pharmaceutical industry) concerning the innovation rate in deepening their technology base. 
However, pharmaceutical companies are slightly more inclined to file for patents in new 
patents classes than companies in the other two industries. The difference between the 
pharmaceutical companies and car manufacturers is weakly significant; this reflects the 
continuous search of pharmaceutical companies to tap into the vast new business 
opportunities that are embedded in emerging technologies such as biotechnology.  
 
The country of origin of the different companies does not play a role in explaining both types 
of innovation. European, Asian and US-based companies have more or less the same 
propensity to deepen and broaden their technology base. 
 
Increasing R&D expenditures have a positive effect on the innovation rate of companies. The 
estimated coefficient of the R&D-expenditures variable is, in both regressions, less than unity. 
As this regressor variable is in the log form, its coefficients in the Poisson specification   28 
represent elasticities of the regressor variable with respect to the dependent variable; positive 
elasticities smaller than 1 indicate that the likelihood of patenting, both in existing and new 
patent classes, increases as more money for research is invested but there are diminishing 
returns on scale. This result is in line with past research (Mansfield, 1981). 
 
Firm size is strongly and positively linked to the deepening of the technology base of 
companies in these three industries. This coefficient can also be interpreted as an elasticity of 
the firm size with respect to the innovation rate. The coefficient is much smaller than unity 
indicating that ‘exploitative’ patenting is less than proportionately growing with firm size. 
This is in line with previous research (Acs and Audretsch, 1991). On the contrary, the size of 
a company is not related to the patenting frequency in new patent classes (see table 3b). This 
finding is in line with the organizational learning literature: established organizations have 
difficulties in diversifying into new technological areas, inhibiting experimentation and 
favoring specialization along existing technological trajectories (Levinthal and March, 1993; 
March, 1991; Ahuja and Morris Lampert, 2001). According to our results, small and large 
companies have the same probability of patenting in new technology classes. Small firms can 
be as successful as large ones with respect to experimenting and exploring new technological 
fields.   
 
A last control variable is the technological distance between partners. Its effect on deepening 
the technology base of companies is negative and significant, suggesting that absorptive 
capacity is likely to play an important role in external technology acquisition within 
technological areas in which the company already has some expertise. However, the same 
regressor has no impact at all on the broadening of companies’ technology base. As a result, it 
is advantageous to carefully select alliance partners who have a similar technology profile 
when a company intends to deepen its technology base. This is no longer true for companies 
that intend to experiment with technological areas beyond their technology base: allying with 
partners with quite different or similar technology profiles will not influence the success of 
the company’s technological diversification strategy
18.   
 
                                                
18  This is not to say that the technological distance between the focal firm and its partners is not important.  
Nooteboom (1999, 2000) argues that there exists an inverted U-shaped relationship between inter-
organizational learning and cognitive distance: inter-organizational learning is most successful when 
partners have a moderately different technology profile. Wuyts et al. (2003) found empirical evidence for 
this hypothesis.    29 
The estimated alpha coefficient is positive and significant for both exploitative and 
explorative learning. This suggests that there are important firm-level unobserved effects in 
the data that were captured by this parameter.  
 
Model 2 introduces the social capital as a regressor, measured as the number of alliances a 
company established in the five previous years. Besides the linear term we also inserted the 
quadratic term to measure the impact of overembeddedness (Kogut et al., 1992; Uzzi, 1997). 
The coefficients for this variable are significant in both tables: More ties help companies to 
both deepen and broaden their technology base up to a certain point, beyond which the effect 
of overembeddedness dominates.  The maximums are reached at relatively high levels of 
social capital – 64 alliances for exploitative learning and 80 for explorative learning – 
indicating that overembeddedness only plays a major role at high levels of social capital. 
However, the impact of social capital on both types of learning differs considerably: 
according to model 2 companies can at best increase the patenting rate with 13.7% in case 
they intend to deepen their knowledge base. In contrast, companies can drastically broaden 
their technology base through a network of technology alliances – with a maximum increase 
in the (explorative) patenting rate of 142%. Similarly, the impact of a one-standard-deviation 
increase in social capital at the mean level (=14.16 alliances (see table 2)) is much larger for 
explorative learning than for exploitative learning, i.e. respectively 24.3% [13.42*(3.9779 – 
2*0.0309*14.16)] versus 4.2% [13.42*(22.0241 – 2* 0.1374*14.16)]. 
 
These results support hypothesis 1b, which predicted a stronger effect of social capital on 
explorative learning compared to exploitative learning. The difference happens to be quite 
large, indicating that the impact of external acquisition of technological know-how through 
alliances is larger when companies are experimenting in new technological areas compared to 
the strengthening of their existing technological capabilities.  
 
Model 3 adds indirect ties as an explanatory variable. Hypothesis 2 is empirically supported: 
The coefficients are positive and significant in both tables and the impact is significantly 
larger on explorative than on exploitative learning. As a result, social capital of a company is 
not only determined by its direct ties but also by the number of firms it can reach in the 
alliance network.  Moreover, the impact of indirect ties is significantly larger in case a 
company is involved in explorative learning. The uncertainty involved in explorative research 
and its tacit nature pushes the focal firm to search for solutions among the partners of its   30 
partners. Hence, partners of a focal firm are not only valuable because of their technological 
know-how but also because of their social capital. The social capital of partners becomes even 
more important in the case of explorative learning. 
 
Model 4 brings in the interaction term between direct and indirect ties and is an empirical test 
for hypothesis 3.  We have argued – following Ahuja (2000a) – that the impact of indirect ties 
will be moderated by the number of direct ties, at least in the case of exploitative learning. 
This is supported by model 4 in table 3a. Because a focal firm has a good understanding of 
what type of knowledge is required and since the information involved is fairly explicit in 
exploitative learning, direct ties may easily overlap the knowledge that could be acquired 
from indirect contacts.  The coefficient of this interaction term in table 3b is positive but not 
significant (it becomes weakly significant in some of the following models). This is in line 
with our expectations of hypothesis 3. In the case of explorative learning, implying tacit 
knowledge and high levels of uncertainty, it might be valuable to have more direct contacts to 
explore and understand the possibilities related to the knowledge base of indirect contacts. In 
other words, because of the cognitive distance in explorative learning partners may be helpful 
in accessing and exploring the knowledge base of their partners. However, the coefficient of 
the interaction term is not (or only weakly) significant. 
 
Models 5 to 9 allow us to test hypotheses 4 and 5. We have five variables that measure the 
network structure of social capital in different ways; three of them are based on cohesion and 
two on structural equivalence.  ‘Proportion density’ gives an idea of the density of ties among 
a focal firm’s alliance partners. From hypothesis 4, we expect a positive and significant 
relation between a dense network of ties among a focal firm’s partners an its ability to deepen 
its existing technology base.  This is what we find in model 5 in table 3a. The opposite should 
be true when a company intends to broaden its technology base. We find a negative and 
significant coefficient in model 5 in table 3b. As a result, hypothesis 5 is corroborated: when a 
firm’s partners are connected to each other a company becomes less successful in its 
explorative learning.  
 
‘Network efficiency’ is another variable measuring the non-redundancy within a firm’s ego-
network. High values for this variable indicate that a firm’s direct contacts provide non-
redundant information. We expect a negative and significant coefficient in table 3a. The sign   31 
is correct but the coefficient is not significant.  The coefficient in table 3b indicates that non-
redundancy among a firm’s partners improves explorative learning.      
 
A high value for the variable ‘clique overlap centrality’ indicates that a company is in the 
midst of dense clusters of ties and is confronted with a lot of redundant information. 
Consequently, we expect a positive and significant relation between high clique overlap 
centrality and exploitative learning. This is corroborated by the result in table 3a. As expected, 
we find that this variable has a negative effect on a firm’s explorative learning. However, this 
coefficient is not-statistically significant. 
 
Model 8 measures the effect of the first of two variables that captures redundancy based on 
structural equivalence. The calculation of structural equivalence is based on the correlation 
coefficient of every pair of profiles of the direct partners of the focal firm: high (low) values 
represent (non-)redundancy. The coefficient for exploitative learning is positive and 
significant as expected. For explorative learning the coefficient is negative but not statistically 
significant.  
 
The last model shows the effect of  ‘the pattern of partner sharing’ on exploitative and 
explorative learning. This variable is different from the other network structure variables 
because it does not measure social capital of an individual (focal) firm but how relations of 
the structurally equivalent group to which it belongs are distributed among different partner 
groups. We have argued that high values of this variable indicate to the presence of a 
‘learning highway’ between two important groups of firms with different technological 
capabilities. Since firms of both ends of the ‘highway’ are structurally equivalent, they can 
easily learn from each other through spillover effects. We have mentioned before that this is 
an advantageous situation for learning – and especially for explorative learning. The 
coefficients in tables 3a and 3b affirm that being part of the ‘learning highway’ fosters both 





This paper focuses on the impact of firms’ social capital on their exploitative and explorative 
learning. March (1991) argues that each company needs to balance both types of learning to   32 
stay competitive in the short and the long run. There are considerable differences between 
both types of learning (March, 1991; Chesbrough, 2003), which, in turn, have important 
implications for the way in which a company has to get access to and profit from the 
technological capabilities of its alliance partners. We argued that the value of a firm’s alliance 
network is contingent on the type of learning. Since exploitative and explorative learning are 
quite different in nature, we assume that the role of alliances and the structure of the alliance 
network are contingent on the type of learning: redundant information coming from alliance 
partners that are mutually linked to each other in dense networks improves exploitative 
learning. Non-redundant information enhances a firm’s explorative learning and requires that 
the firm’s ego-network spans structural holes.  
 
We formulated several hypotheses about the impact of direct ties, indirect ties, and the 
alliance network structure on the success of firms’ explorative an exploitative learning. We 
found empirical evidence that direct ties spur both types of learning although there is an 
optimal level of social capital beyond which the effect of overembeddedness dominates. 
Furthermore, there is strong evidence that social capital has a much larger impact on 
explorative learning than on exploitative learning. We can conclude that external acquisition 
of technological know-how through alliances is more important when companies are 
experimenting in new technological areas than when they intend to strengthen their existing 
technological capabilities.  
 
Indirect ties also have a beneficial effect on both types of learning but the impact on the latter 
(explorative learning) is again much larger. Interestingly, the empirical results show that 
direct ties have a moderating effect on the impact of indirect ties on exploitative learning 
(which resembles the results of Ahuja (2000a)), but this is no longer the case for explorative 
learning. Several direct ties provide different ways to explore the tacit and highly-uncertain 
technological knowledge in explorative learning. 
 
Finally, there is some empirical evidence that a firm profits from redundant ties when it is 
primarily interested in the refinement if its existing technology base and competencies, while 
non-redundant ties are advantageous in explorative learning. Consequently, we can conclude 
that the value of the network closure (Coleman, 1988, 1990) and the structural holy theory of 
social capital (Burt, 1992a, 2000) is contingent on the type of organizational learning.   
   33 
In contrast with most studies we calculated several variables that measure (non)-redundancy 
in alliance networks in different ways. The results for the network structure variables are 
consistent in the sense that all coefficients had the expected sign. However, there is some 
variability in the statistical significance of these coefficients across the models. We draw two 
conclusions from this: First, these variables measure redundancy in different ways, and it is 
not a priori clear that these different ‘dimensions’ of redundancy should have the same effect 
on exploitative or explorative learning. Redundancy by cohesion or by structural equivalence 
represents one of these differences that are worth probing further. Second, the empirical 
results in prior studies may be influenced by the choice of the variable.          
 
That ‘redundancy’ is a multi-dimensional concept is illustrated by the viable ‘pattern of 
partner sharing’. Walker et al. (1997) use this concept to detect partner overlap. The concept 
does not measure social capital of an individual (focal) firm but it indicates how the relations 
of the structural equivalent group to which the firm belongs are distributed among partner 
groups. Applied to inter-organizational learning, we argue that this variable measures a 
particular network structure that is quite different from the other redundancy measures. High 
values for this variable represent a type of ‘learning highway’ between two groups of firms 
with different technological capabilities. Firms not only learn from their direct and indirect 
partners, but they can also take advantage from the knowledge spillovers from structurally 
equivalent partners who have dense contacts with other structurally equivalent partner groups. 
We expected that this variable has a stronger effect on explorative learning because of the 
high uncertainty involved. In this situation it might be comfortable for explorers to get 
feedback from other companies in their structurally equivalent group about their alliance 
based learning.  The empirical evidence shows that high values for the ‘pattern of partner 
sharing’-variable stimulate the two types of learning but the impact is significantly larger on 
explorative learning.  
 
This study has of course its limitations. First, we focused only the redundancy of the 
information in a firm’s alliance network. We did not pay attention to the strength of the ties: 
there is empirical evidence that the value of strong and weak ties depends on the type of 
learning (Rowley et al., 2000). Next, we have paid no attention to the cognitive distance 
between a company and its partners although it is beyond doubt that, compared to exploitative 
learning, partners should have a different technology profile than the focal-firm in explorative 
learning. This raises the question what the optimal ‘cognitive distance’ should be between   34 
alliance partners, when they or involved in exploitative or explorative learning (Nooteboom 
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Table 1: Definitions of dependent and independent variables 
 
 
Variable name Variable description  
 
Exploitative learning Count  of the number of patents a firm filed for in year t within patent classes in which is has dependent variable 
  been active in the five years prior to the given year  
Explorative learning Count  of the number of patents a firm filed for in year t within patent classes in which is has dependent variable 
  not been active in the five years prior to the given year   
Cumulative patents Count of the number patents that a firm filed for during the previous five years (t-5 to t-1)  
(Cumulative patents)
2 Squared term of previous variable   
Indirect ties ‘Distance weighted centrality’: Count of indirect ties but weighted to account for the decline in tie 
  strength across progressively distant ties  
Proportion density Density of ties among a focal firm’s direct partners expressed as a proportion of all possible ties 
   between them  
Network efficiency ‘Effective size’ divided by the number of partners in the focal-firm’s ego-network (Burt, 1992, p. 53)    
Clique overlap centrality The number of cliques to which a firm belongs, normalized to the industry maximum  (Gulati, 1999)  
Structural equival. (corr.) Average correlation of every pair of profiles of the direct partners of the focal firm (Hansen, 1999)  
Pattern partner sharing Dispersion of densities between different structurally equivalent groups normalized by the 
  network structure (Walker et al., 1997)  
 
Age  The number of years since a company is founded   
Firm size (ln revenues) Natural logarithm of the total sales of the firm in t-1 (x  1000 Euro)   
R&D expenditures (ln) Natural logarithm of the total R&D expenditures in t-1 (x 1000 Euro)  
Year  Dummy variable indicating a particular year (1986-1997)  
Chemical company Dummy variable set to one if the firm is a chemical company 
Car manufacturer Dummy variable set to one if the firm is a car manufacturer 
Europe Dummy variable set to one if the firm is headquartered in Europe 
US  Dummy variable set to one if the firm is headquartered in the US 
 
 
Note: All network variables are based on alliance network representing all the technology-based alliances that were established in an industry during the five years prior to 
year t   43 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
 
Variable Mean S.D. Min. Max. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15  
 
1 # of exploitative patents 102.23 156.81 0 1136   
2 # of exploitative patents  9.19 14.92 0 125 0.24  
3 Direct ties 14.16 13.42 2  113 0.51 0.25  
4 Indirect ties 68.31 32.01 0 177.0 -0.12 0.03 -0.17  
5 Proportion density 0.146 0.231 0 1 -0.16 -0.09 -0.11 -0.15  
6 Network efficiency 0.884 0.167 0.1 1 0.15 0.08 0.05 0.16 -0.96  
7 Clique overlap centrality 2.85 4.49 0 28 0.43 0.20 0.87 -0.25 -0.01 -0.04  
8  Structural equival. (corr.) 0.152 0.193 -0.012 1 -0.12 -0.06 0.05 -0.22 0.92 -0.92 0.15  
9  Pattern partner sharing 0.314 0.143 0.003 0.5 0.07 0.08 0.18 0.30 -0.04 0.00 0.17 -0.05  
10 Age 79.75 45.82 0 236 0.13 -0.06 0.12 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.09 0.05 0.04  
11 Firm size (log sales) 8.659 1.804 0.29 11.91 0.39 0.23 0.43 -0.20 -0.08 0.05 0.39 0.03 0.03 0.38  
12 R&D expenditures(ln) 5.623 1.703 -1.83 8.94 0.42 0.23 0.40 -0.07 -0.13 0.11 0.40 -0.03 0.08 0.27 0.73  
13 Techn. distance partners 0.022 0.009 0 0.063 0.02 0.04 -0.11 0.27 -0.13 0.18 -0.20 -0.21 -0.06 0.05 -0.11 0.07  
14 Chemical company 0.376 0.485 0 1 0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.11 0.07 -0.07 -0.04 0.08 -0.10 0.16 0.10 -0.07 -0.17  
15 Car manufacturer 0.270 0.444 0 1 0.05 0.03 0.25 -0.33 0.13 -0.20 0.36 0.20 0.07 0.04 0.33 0.26 -0.15 -0.47  
16 Firm is European 0.233 0.423 0 1 -0.26 -0.02 0.01 -0.11 0.13 -0.18 0.02 0.18 -0.05 -0.07 -0.03 -0.06 -0.14 0.11 0.13 
17 Firm is US-based 0.429 0.495 0 1 0.04 0.01 -0.02 0.17 -0.18 0.20 -0.11 -0.23 0.01 -0.05 -0.14 -0.12 0.17 -0.14 -0.18 
18 Year 1986 0.081 0.273 0 1 -0.03 -0.02 -0.08 -0.27 0.05 -0.04 -0.08 0.08 -0.26 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 0.00 0.01 -0.00 
19 Year 1987 0.087 0.282 0 1 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 -0.26 0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.00 0.03 
20 Year 1988 0.081 0.273 0 1 0.00 0.01 -0.03 -0.09 0.07 -0.06 -0.01 0.05 0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.00 -0.02 0.01 
21 Year 1989 0.081 0.273 0 1 0.01 0.02 -0.00 -0.03 0.05 -0.04 0.03 0.02 0.07 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 -0.10 -0.01 -0.00 
22 Year 1990 0.087 0.282 0 1 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.09 -0.00 0.01 
23 Year 1991  0.087 0.282 0 1 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.00 -0.05 0.05 0.04 -0.05 0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.01 
24 Year 1992 0.082 0.275 0 1 0.01 -0.07 -0.00 0.02 -0.07 0.06 -0.02 -0.06 0.14 0.04 0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.00 0.01 
25 Year 1993 0.084 0.277 0 1 0.00 -0.07 0.00 0.01 -0.05 0.05 -0.00 -0.04 -0.17 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.01 
26 Year 1994 0.081 0.273 0 1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.10 -0.05 0.05 -0.01 -0.04 -0.20 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.00 -0.00 
27 Year 1995 0.082 0.275 0 1 0.05 0.15 0.02 0.09 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.10 -0.00 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.01 -0.02 
28 Year 1996 0.082 0.275 0 1 -0.00 0.07 0.05 0.17 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.00 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.02 -0.02 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix (continued) 
 
Variable 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
 
16 Firm is European  
17 Firm is US-based -0.48  
18 Year 1986 0.03 -0.02  
19 Year 1987 0.01 -0.02 -0.09  
20 Year 1988 -0.02 0.01 -0.08 -0.09  
21 Year 1989 -0.01 0.00 -0.08 -0.09 -0.08  
22 Year 1990 -0.00 -0.01 -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09  
23 Year 1991  -0.02 0.01 -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.10  
24 Year 1992 -0.01 -0.00 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09  
25 Year 1993 -0.02 0.00 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09  
26 Year 1994 -0.02 0.01 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09  
27 Year 1995 0.02 -0.00 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09  
28  Year 1996 0.02 0.01 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09  
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Table 3a: Determinants of the patent rate of firms – deepening the technology base, 1986-1997 
 
 
 Variable Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9  Model 10 
Direct ties 
Cumulative alliances /1000  3.9779*** 3.2458*** 9.7154*** 8.9812*** 9.7595*** 5.4633*** 9.2376*** 8.4356*** 
   (0.6936) (0.7023) (1.0153) (1.0203) (1.0159) (1.2238) (1.0181) (1.0493) 
(Cumulative alliances/1000)
2  -0.0309*** -0.0202*** -0.0636*** -0.0594*** -0.0637*** -0.0368*** -0.0607*** -0.0541*** 
   (0.0066) (0.0068) (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0087) (0.0084) (0.0086) 
Indirect ties 
Distance weighted centrality   0.0011*** 0.0024*** 0.0024*** 0.0025*** 0.0026*** 0.0027*** 0.0021*** 
    (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
((Distance weighted centrality)      -0.0919*** -0.0865*** -0.0940*** -0.0800*** -0.0962*** -0.0853*** 
 * (cumulative alliances))/1000   (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0105) (0.0106) 
Structural holes vs. netwerk closure 
 Via cohesion 
Proportion density     0.1777***    
      (0.0295)  
Network efficiency      -0.0405 
       (0.0307) 
Clique overlap centrality       0.0229***  
        (0.0019)   
Via structural equivalence 
Correlation (Hansen)       
  0.1709***    
  (0.0279)  
Pattern of partner sharing         0.1650*** 
          (0.0338) 
Control variables 
Car manufacturer 0.2247 0.0121 -0.0451 -0.0411 0.0135 -0.0618 -0.0809 -0.0449 -0.0584 
  (0.4527) (0.4609) (0.4686) (0.4611) (0.4685) (0.4606) (0.4724) (0.4615) (0.4622)   46 
Chemical industry -0.1162 -0.0484 -0.1109 -0.0660 -0.0564 -0.0718 -0.1279 -0.0694 -0.0752 
  (0.4041) (0.4082) (0.4114) (0.4098) (0.4115) (0.4101) (0.4136) (0.4101) (0.4104) 
Europe -0.6618 -0.6013 -0.5185 -0.6175 -0.7047 -0.6232 -0.5188 -0.6149 -0.6035 
  (0.5171) (0.5263) (0.5338) (0.5231) (0.5282) (0.5228) (0.5375) (0.5236) (0.5236)  
US  0.1074 0.1225 0.1777 0.1547 0.1239 0.1577 0.1657 0.1563 0.1701 
  (0.3807) (0.3847) (0.3883) (0.3850) (0.3893) (0.3853) (0.3895) (0.3853) (0.3856) 
Age  -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0004 
  (0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0046) (00046) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0046) (0.0046) 
Firm size (ln sales) 0.2239*** 0.2205*** 0.2072*** 0.1889*** 0.1828*** 0.1939*** 0.2114*** 0.1899*** 0.1844*** 
  (0.0304) (0.0305) (0.0307) (0.0307) (0.0311) (0.0308) (0.0309) (0.0308) (0.0307) 
ln R&D 0.3561*** 0.3725*** 0.3984*** 0.3934*** 0.3983*** 0.3932*** 0.3897*** 0.3941*** 0.3999*** 
  (0.1999) (0.2060) (0.1601) (0.1092) (0.0211) (0.0205) (0.0209) (0.0210) (0.0210) 
Techn. distance -4.480*** -4.5938*** -3.6800*** -3.7920*** -3.8140*** -3.6231*** -1.9475** -3.7476*** -3.7021*** 
 between partners (0.7298) (0.7287) (0.7405) (0.7411) (0.7416) (0.7468) (0.7595) (0.7472) (0.7428) 
Constant 0.4430 0.4428 0.5462 0.6171 0.7256 0.6742 0.5198 0.6054 0.5699 
  (0.5606) (0.5682) (0.5784) (0.5719) (0.5806) (0.5725) (0.5797) (0.5729) (0.5735) 
alpha 1.9223*** 1.9631*** 1.9950*** 1.9704*** 1.9662*** 1.9731*** 2.0171*** 1.9728*** 1.9760*** 
  (0.2781) (0.2835) (0.2878) (0.2844) (0.2860) (0.2847) (0.2907) (0.2848) (0.2851) 
 
Number of firms 74 74 74 74 73 74 74 74 74 
Number of firms-years 662 662 662 662 655 622 662 662 662   
Chi-squared vs. previous  34.39*** 42.08*** 76.54*** 15.67***† 1.87 144.27*** 36.00*** 24.43*** 
 nested model 
    
 
Notes:  Standard error between brackets 
***   p  < 0.01;  **   p  < 0.05;  *   p  < 0.10  
‘Year dummy variable’-coefficients are not reported in the table. 
The models use a random effects Poisson estimator. The sample is an unbalanced panel with 74 firms and 662 firm-years (units of observation). 
  †:In comparison with the previous model based on 655 and not 662 observations.     47 
Table 3b: Determinants of the patent rate of firms – broadening of the technology base, 1986-1997 
 
 
 Variable Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9  
Direct ties 
Cumulative alliances/1000   22.0241*** 15.7093*** 11.9549*** 10.5291*** 13.1300*** 17.6134*** 11.8097*** 8.8143** 
   (2.4417) (2.5066) (3.5217) (3.548) (3.5372) (4.0743) (3.5321) (3.5940) 
(Cumulative alliances/1000)
2  -0.1374*** -0.0656** -0.0418 -0.0307 -0.0721** -0.0551 -0.0406 -0.0203 
   (0.0299) (0.0306) (0.0344) (0.0345) (0.0351) (0.0345) (0.0406) (0.0308) 
Indirect ties 
Distance weighted centrality   0.0042*** 0.0037*** -0.0035*** 0.0017*** 0.0038*** 0.0038*** 0.0027*** 
    (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
((Distance weighted centrality)      0.0454 0.0579* 0.0499* 0.0385 0.0451 0.0559* 
 * (cumulative alliances))/1000   (0.0298) (0.0300) (0.0301) (0.0299) (0.0298) (0.0300) 
Structural holes vs. Netwerk closure 
 Via cohesion 
Proportion density     -0.1477** 
      (0.0707) 
Network efficiency      0.5145*** 
       (0.0647) 
Clique overlap centrality       -0.0178  
        (0.0065) 
Via structural equivalence 
Correlation (Hansen)       
  -0.0539 
         (0.0548) 
Pattern of partner sharing         0.4612*** 
          (0.0971) 
Control variables 
Car manufacturer -0.5534* -0.5729* -0.5291* -0.5320* -0.5911* -0.5493* -0.5207* -0.5344* -0.5281* 
  (0.2987) (0.3032) (0.3033) (0.3037) (0.3193) (0.3042) (0.3040) (0.3038) (0.3035)  48 
Chemical industry -0.2126 -0.2389 -0.2065 -0.2067 -0.2309 -0.2148 -0.1980 -0.2085 -0.2064 
  (0.3069) (0.3114) (0.3103) (0.3109) (0.3173) (0.3106) (0.3110) (0.3109) (0.3106) 
Europe 0.0860 0.1040 0.0933 0.0773 0.1362 0.0705 0.0749 0.0744 0.0735 
  (0.3485) (0.3524) (0.3502) (0.3519) (0.3663) (0.3517) (0.3517) (0.3520) (0.3519) 
US  0.3843 0.4037 0.3834 0.3714 0.4358 0.3688 0.3683 0.3699 0.3655 
  (0.2886) (0.2925) (0.2902) (0.2914) 0.3037 (0.2910) (0.2914) (0.2913) (0.2911) 
Age  -0.0061** -0.0061** -0.0063** -0.0064** -0.0058* -0.0064** -0.0063** -0.0065** -0.0064** 
  (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0029) 
Firm size (ln sales) -0.0285 -0.0243 -0.0150 -0.0144 -0.0272 -0.0087 -0.0193 -0.0128 -0.0141 
  (0.0564) (0.0566) (0.0569) (0.0570) (0.0584) (0.0573) (0.0574) (0.0574) (0.0570) 
ln R&D 0.4484*** 0.4594*** 0.4498*** 0.4480*** 0.4610*** 0.4437*** 0.4502*** 0.4471*** 0.4462*** 
  (0.0464) (0.0473) (0.0477) (0.0478) (0.0500) (0.0479) (0.0480) (0.0480) (0.0479) 
Tecnh. distance -1.4257 -1.5034 -1.892 -1.8731 -2.0867 -1.6801 -2.1178 -1.8093 -2.1047 
 between partners (0.7298) (2.2495) (2.2753) (2.2751) (2.2768) (2.2846) (2.2992) (2.2925) (2.2978) 
Constant 0.1436 0.1170 0.0085 0.0178 0.0422 0.1147 0.0367 0.0078 0.0526 
  (0.5377) (0.5340) (0.5443) (0.5450) (0.5633) (0.5540) (0.5462) (0.5467) (0.5472) 
alpha 0.95704*** 0.9747*** 0.9614*** 0.9632*** 0.9966*** 0.9628*** 0.9636*** 0.9630*** 0.9620*** 
  (0.1610) (0.1648) (0.1627) (0.1629) (0.1704) (0.1623) (0.1691) (0.1628) (0.1625) 
 
Number of firms 74 74 74 74 73 74 74 74 74  
Number of firms-years 662 662 662 662 655 662 662 662 662 
Chi-squared vs. previous  126.90*** 91.80*** 2.46 6.68***†  60.32*** 7.84*** 0.08 24.31*** 
nested model  
  
 
Notes:  Standard error between brackets  
***   p  < 0.01;  **   p  < 0.05;  *   p  < 0.10  
‘Year dummy variable’-coefficients are not reported in the table. 
The models use a random effects Poisson estimator. The sample is an unbalanced panel with 116 firms and 1137 firm-years (units of observation).  
 †:In comparison with the previous model based on 655 and not 662 observations. 
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